I fear I am not well read enough about the Russian economy to say something super insightful, but generally it seems to me that the Russian economy has massive problems due to the war (and before) and at one point something will break, the tricky question is what exactly and when. But from the things I have read it often reads to make like the Russian economy is acceleration towards and cliff and when it gets there, this will be a massive event.
I do not really think that is possible. Every non-Hunter Gatherer society over the last 10,000 years has had rampant inequality. It is not clear that there is an alternative.
And based on your description Blanton et al. (2020) has nothing to do with levels of inequality.
You state that it is about "equitable practices - like fair taxation, limits on leadership power, and impartial courts - generally achieved higher citizen welfare."
Equality and the practices that you mention above are completely separate topics. Admittedly, I have not read the article. I am only relying on your summary.
The reason why I bring up the point is because I recently published articles that have exactly the opposite view:
The "make sure no one is left behind" is more meant as an aspirational goal. Sure, you can never guarantee that everybody is taken care of, but there are clearly different ways possible on how much safety nets and redistribution a society provides for their citizens. Like Norway and the United States have a very different approach here to just make one example.
"Equality and the practices that you mention above are completely separate topics". I don't think so. If you want to do any economic redistribution you need fair taxation and fair taxation is only possible if you keep special interests in check, for which you need limits on leadership power and impartial courts.
Ok, I will not get fixated on the title, but there is a much bigger issue.
I think that you are missing my point.
You are mixing up policies with outcomes. Equality is not just the output of policies or institutions. Nations with identical policies and institutions can have very different levels of Equality, and vice versa.
None of those things (fair taxation, limits on leadership power, and impartial courts - generally achieved higher citizen welfare.) create Equality.
All modern and agricultural societies have very high levels of inequality, so how could Inequality be a key factor in collapse? There is simply not enough variation.
If we had many societies with Equality, then we could test your hypothesis, but there are not.
Just to use your examples, it is not clear that Norway is significantly further from collapse than the United States despite different levels of inequality.
The USA has more progressive taxes than Norway, and it is not clear that there is much difference on the other dimensions. I lived in Denmark so I am very familiar with the Scandinavian tax and social welfare system.
Iceland and Switzerland, for example, has a much smaller welfare state and lower taxes than Norway, and similar levels of Inequality.
I think that your moral dislike of Inequality is distorting your objectivity on the impact of Inequality on social collapse.
Historical and archaeological research actually shows significant variation in inequality levels across societies and times. For example, as discussed in the post, Teotihuacan maintained a Gini coefficient of 0.12 - far lower than modern societies. The comparative study of Egypt and England's responses to the Black Death also reveals how different institutional responses led to divergent inequality trajectories.
The core argument isn't that all inequality leads to collapse, but rather that rapid increases in inequality, especially when combined with elite capture of institutions, can make societies more vulnerable to other destabilizing forces. This is supported by research like Blanton et al. (2020) showing how elite abandonment of societal obligations often preceded collapse in premodern states.
The relationship between specific policies and inequality outcomes is complex and not deterministic. Rather than argue for any particular policy approach, the key insight from historical examples is that societies have multiple paths to manage inequality. They can either proactively reform (as suggested by Schmidt & Juijn 2024), or risk facing what Scheidel termed the "Four Horsemen" - warfare, revolution, state failure and pandemics - as violent resets.
The goal isn't to argue that any particular level of inequality inevitably leads to collapse, but to understand how changes in inequality interact with other risk factors.
Your description of Teotihuacán seems to diverge from my understanding of it, and I wonder why. You wrote: "Teotihuacan [...] was much stronger than its surrounding cities and therefore did not need to result in large-scale warfare and it also experienced neither revolution nor state failure"
Did Teotihuacán not do large-scale warfare against neighbors? Here are some examples I found on a cursory search:
- 378 CE conquest of Tikal
- 4th century CE military control over Kaminaljuyú
- Teotihuacan may have been involved in conflicts with Cholula
- Some scholars argue that Teotihuacan may have launched military campaigns to secure trade routes or resources in Zapotec
- Teotihuacan likely engaged in military campaigns against rival city-states in the Basin of Mexico, like Cuicuilco
I think I just phrased this too vaguely. I did not want to make the point that Teotihuacán never did any warfare, but that it did not have to result to long-term, large-scale warfare, because it was just much more powerful than its neighbors. Yes, it conquered Tikal, but as it was so much more powerful, the conflict did not last that long. The conquest of Tikal probably only took a few weeks and for war to change the equality in your society it needs to be very involved and take longer.
To your second point, yes the city did fall, but the argument is that it archived low inequality without a revolution or state failure being responsible for the low inequality, not that the low inequality made it forever resistant to collapse.
That is a very interesting breakdown of the topic as a whole.
What do you make of economic equality in terms of Russian stability?
https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/12/russia-economy-difficulties?lang=en
https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soc4.13196
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/risks-russias-two-speed-economy-2025
I fear I am not well read enough about the Russian economy to say something super insightful, but generally it seems to me that the Russian economy has massive problems due to the war (and before) and at one point something will break, the tricky question is what exactly and when. But from the things I have read it often reads to make like the Russian economy is acceleration towards and cliff and when it gets there, this will be a massive event.
Thank you for your thoughts.
How do you "make sure no one is left behind?"
I do not really think that is possible. Every non-Hunter Gatherer society over the last 10,000 years has had rampant inequality. It is not clear that there is an alternative.
And based on your description Blanton et al. (2020) has nothing to do with levels of inequality.
You state that it is about "equitable practices - like fair taxation, limits on leadership power, and impartial courts - generally achieved higher citizen welfare."
Equality and the practices that you mention above are completely separate topics. Admittedly, I have not read the article. I am only relying on your summary.
The reason why I bring up the point is because I recently published articles that have exactly the opposite view:
https://frompovertytoprogress.substack.com/p/is-inequality-the-key-problem
https://frompovertytoprogress.substack.com/p/why-achieving-equality-is-an-impossible
The "make sure no one is left behind" is more meant as an aspirational goal. Sure, you can never guarantee that everybody is taken care of, but there are clearly different ways possible on how much safety nets and redistribution a society provides for their citizens. Like Norway and the United States have a very different approach here to just make one example.
"Equality and the practices that you mention above are completely separate topics". I don't think so. If you want to do any economic redistribution you need fair taxation and fair taxation is only possible if you keep special interests in check, for which you need limits on leadership power and impartial courts.
Thanks for the links, I'll check them out.
Ok, I will not get fixated on the title, but there is a much bigger issue.
I think that you are missing my point.
You are mixing up policies with outcomes. Equality is not just the output of policies or institutions. Nations with identical policies and institutions can have very different levels of Equality, and vice versa.
None of those things (fair taxation, limits on leadership power, and impartial courts - generally achieved higher citizen welfare.) create Equality.
All modern and agricultural societies have very high levels of inequality, so how could Inequality be a key factor in collapse? There is simply not enough variation.
If we had many societies with Equality, then we could test your hypothesis, but there are not.
Just to use your examples, it is not clear that Norway is significantly further from collapse than the United States despite different levels of inequality.
The USA has more progressive taxes than Norway, and it is not clear that there is much difference on the other dimensions. I lived in Denmark so I am very familiar with the Scandinavian tax and social welfare system.
Iceland and Switzerland, for example, has a much smaller welfare state and lower taxes than Norway, and similar levels of Inequality.
I think that your moral dislike of Inequality is distorting your objectivity on the impact of Inequality on social collapse.
Historical and archaeological research actually shows significant variation in inequality levels across societies and times. For example, as discussed in the post, Teotihuacan maintained a Gini coefficient of 0.12 - far lower than modern societies. The comparative study of Egypt and England's responses to the Black Death also reveals how different institutional responses led to divergent inequality trajectories.
The core argument isn't that all inequality leads to collapse, but rather that rapid increases in inequality, especially when combined with elite capture of institutions, can make societies more vulnerable to other destabilizing forces. This is supported by research like Blanton et al. (2020) showing how elite abandonment of societal obligations often preceded collapse in premodern states.
The relationship between specific policies and inequality outcomes is complex and not deterministic. Rather than argue for any particular policy approach, the key insight from historical examples is that societies have multiple paths to manage inequality. They can either proactively reform (as suggested by Schmidt & Juijn 2024), or risk facing what Scheidel termed the "Four Horsemen" - warfare, revolution, state failure and pandemics - as violent resets.
The goal isn't to argue that any particular level of inequality inevitably leads to collapse, but to understand how changes in inequality interact with other risk factors.
Your description of Teotihuacán seems to diverge from my understanding of it, and I wonder why. You wrote: "Teotihuacan [...] was much stronger than its surrounding cities and therefore did not need to result in large-scale warfare and it also experienced neither revolution nor state failure"
Did Teotihuacán not do large-scale warfare against neighbors? Here are some examples I found on a cursory search:
- 378 CE conquest of Tikal
- 4th century CE military control over Kaminaljuyú
- Teotihuacan may have been involved in conflicts with Cholula
- Some scholars argue that Teotihuacan may have launched military campaigns to secure trade routes or resources in Zapotec
- Teotihuacan likely engaged in military campaigns against rival city-states in the Basin of Mexico, like Cuicuilco
Did Teotihuacán not experience revolution nor state failure? I might be misunderstanding, but the city did fall and it seems to be typically considered to have been caused by internal strife or even class war. See for example: https://www.smh.com.au/world/class-war-brought-down-the-ancient-teotihuacan-civilisation-according-to-study-20150320-1m3gh2.html
I'm not a historian and could just be wrong, but there seems to be some discrepancy or misunderstanding here.
I think I just phrased this too vaguely. I did not want to make the point that Teotihuacán never did any warfare, but that it did not have to result to long-term, large-scale warfare, because it was just much more powerful than its neighbors. Yes, it conquered Tikal, but as it was so much more powerful, the conflict did not last that long. The conquest of Tikal probably only took a few weeks and for war to change the equality in your society it needs to be very involved and take longer.
To your second point, yes the city did fall, but the argument is that it archived low inequality without a revolution or state failure being responsible for the low inequality, not that the low inequality made it forever resistant to collapse.